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THE
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
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
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THE WAR IN EGYPT



EGYPTIAN OFFICER SURRENDERING TO SIR EVELYN WOOD.



THE HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY IN THE ENTRENCHMENT AT TEL-EL-KEBIR.

B. SIMMONS, DEL.


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THE WAR IN EGYPT

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VIEW OF THE HARBOR OF ALEXANDRIA. H. M. S. HELICON IN FOREGROUND.

LONDON:
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS,
BROADWAY, LUDGATE HILL.
NEW YORK. 9, LAFAYETTE PLACE
1883.

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
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
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
EMBARKATION OF THE SCOTS GUARDS.

THE WAR IN EGYPT.

THE campaign which has just closed will be memorable in English annals and attract attention in history as marking the turning point of our military system. It is true that when compared with the vast armies of modern times the effort may appear insignificant and the enemy not worthy of crossing swords with the power of England. The remarkable nature of the expedition consists in this—that it is probably the first instance in English military history where the means were exactly calculated for the end to be obtained, where the Government thoroughly supported the commander of its choice, and the campaign was brought to a conclusion in the very manner and at the very time which had been calculated in London before a single soldier was sent forth from this country. The rosy veil which time hangs between us and the past prevents us from recollecting the bare realities of wars which have gone by. Our greatest successes have been obtained under circumstances of great difficulty from want of proper provision of means. England could not have been in such danger



A STREET IN THE ARAB QUARTER, ALEXANDRIA.



TYPES OF THE TROOPS DESPATCHED FROM INDIA.

from the Spanish Armada but for the extreme parsimony of Elizabeth and the difficulties which were made in preparing ships of war. At the commencement of Wellington's career in the Peninsular war the pursuit after the battle of Vimiera was stopped "because the artillery carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service, the draft horses few and bad, the commissariat park in the greatest confusion, and the hired Portuguese carmen making off with their carriages in all directions." If it be said that this was only the commencement of war, and that things mended rapidly, we reply in Napier's words, which referred to a later period: — "Wellington had to struggle with the negligence and even opposition of the Cabinet to his measures in detail. The clothing of the Spanish troops and the greatcoats of the British soldiers for 1813 were not ready till January, 1814, because the inferior departments could not comprehend that new scenes of exertion required new means. The lapse of more than a quarter of a century has not yet quite effaced the recollection of the "horrible and heartrending" scenes in the Crimea brought about purely by want of previous organization and want of capacity for military administration. If the Egyptian revolt has been put down and the fire prevented from spreading throughout the Mahomedan world, the result has been great, though the means employed may have seemed comparatively small. And the success is to a very great extent due to the efficient and businesslike manner in which the preparations for war were undertaken.

To understand the causes which led to the war, and even the extraordinary nature of its conclusion, it is necessary to cast a backward glance over the history of the Egyptian army, which has already been given in detail in the columns of *The Times*. For, whatever aspirations there may be among a portion of the Egyptian people, the events of the campaign have shown that the main, and we might almost say the only immediate, cause of the war was the revolt of the senior officers against military reduction and reorganization. Until lately the Egyptian army has been the sport of its rulers, but certain traditions have been handed down through one change after another, and the body of senior officers have considered themselves masters of



BRITISH LINESMEN.

the army. The patient and industrious fallaheen who, if any one, ought to decide what the aspirations of Egypt really are, have had no voice whatever in military government. The colonels of regiments have been almost entirely Turks, and from their ranks have been taken not only the generals, but even the principal Ministers and other functionaries. Egypt was in no danger from any neighbouring State, and there was, therefore, no anxiety among the officers that their regiments should do them credit in war. The struggle has always been one for place and power among the colonels, and the common soldiers were but accessories to that




EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS.

end. Since the time of Mehemet Ali, successive Viceroys have made sport with the military system, each one devising an organization of his own, which in one case—that of Said—was even worse than ridiculous. Ismail certainly improved the military system, and created a force which was to some extent serviceable. But his reckless expenditure brought about such a financial collapse that great reduction and more economical administration became absolutely necessary. This reorganization was undertaken by the Ministry of Tewfik, and was upon a plan which would have given in time an army even more formidable than was required for Egyptian needs. But it struck a blow against the absolute power and status of the colonels. When we remember the intensity of the struggle carried on even in this constitutional country by officers against the abolition of purchase and the introduction of promotion by merit, we may form some idea of the desperation of a class


in Egypt which has been accustomed to regard the army as its milch cow. Strict examinations for promotion were introduced, and, what is more, efforts were made to render them a reality, and the economy introduced into all branches of administration forbade the hope of making fortunes out of the military system. This is in truth the main cause of the revolt; this the grudge which the colonels, and the class who expected to be colonels, have had against the Khedive and European control. The combined result of the reforms and of the fight against them was that at the time of the revolt the Egyptian army

was weakened by economy, while its heart was turned against all European interference with the organization of the country. The falsehoods which Arabi and his lieutenants have found themselves obliged to disseminate are sufficient proof that the movement was artificial, and not caused by any natural uprising of spirit.

The condition of the English army was exactly the reverse of that which we have just described. The fruits of short service, even though the system had not been worked out in its full integrity, had produced an infantry reserve as great as the whole of the army first sent to the Crimean war, and the regiments which were approaching their turn for foreign service had been raised nearly to the strength as part of the ordinary military system of the country. The arrangement was not quite complete, and a few months more would have seen the army still better prepared. But it was sufficient for its purpose. The Government had also the good fortune to have as advisers men who had not been opponents of the new organization. The Minister who holds the seals of the War Office has had the good sense and the courage to act on the best military opinion, and the Treasury has been wise enough to perceive that there is no means more calculated to make a war expensive than endeavouring to do it more cheaply than the necessities of the case demand. The idea was prevalent in some quarters that England's duty would be fulfilled if, in conjunction with France, she sent a force to occupy the principal points of the Suez Canal; but from such efforts as these no good results could ever have come, and the Government determined that if a force had to be sent at all the business should be thoroughly done. We have on several occasions laid before our readers the various measures which were taken by the War Office. They have proved to be ample to ensure success except in one particular—namely, that of transport. And even there the failure was not due to the arrangements of the present Government, but to a Constitutional, though exaggerated, safeguard which prevents all English Governments from spending money on military preparations until Parliament has declared in favour of a war by granting supplies.




BRITISH SEAMEN.




H. M. S. HOTSPUR FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF



E FORTS AT ALEXANDRIA.






BRITISH MAN OF WAR'S BOAT IN THE HARBOUR OF ALEXANDRIA.

we propose to touch on this subject hereafter in combination with other lessons taught us by the campaign. In the meantime it is only necessary to say that, although most of the requisite mules for transport were not bought in time to be of use during early operations, the necessity for buying them had not been forgotten. Orders were telegraphed to various parts of the world to be prepared to buy transport animals; and the fact that this provision proved to be insufficient shows, not that there was any slackness on the part of the War Office, but that if the country is ever to be ready for war some additional power must be placed in the hands of successive Governments so that preparatory measures can be taken when war is probable, though not certain.


It is not our present purpose to review the political events which preceded the massacres of Alexandria on the 11th of June. They formed so complete a challenge to European civilization that the glove could hardly fail to be taken up. From that moment it became certain that Arabi Pasha must be suppressed or European influence in Egypt abandoned. But the paralysis of Europe from her own intestine feuds and the aversion of the English Government from all but absolutely necessary war caused



BAGGAGE ANIMALS AND TRANSPORT CARTS.

a delay which might have been much longer but for the insensate obstinacy of the insurgents in continuing to erect new forts and to mount in them heavy rifled guns which had been, together with their ammunition, purchased in England and actually proved officially by the English Government at a time when the last thought in men's minds would have been the possibility of a struggle with the Egyptian army. Even then great patience was shown, and it was not till several new works had been built and almost every day saw new muzzles bearing upon the English ships, while preparations were made to block the mouth of the harbour, that Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour acted upon the permission telegraphed to him from England, and, on July 6, sent in an ultimatum, followed by another on the 9th, the purport of which was that unless certain forts were dismantled within 24 hours he would open fire upon them. The Egyptian authorities made some attempts at procrastination, but were quite unable,

even if willing, to move the army to act in the matter. On the evening of the 10th of July, the English ironclads steamed out of the inner harbour, and took up positions opposite the different works. The Fleet was arranged in two divisions, with a reserve. In the outer harbour, the *Monarch*, the *Invincible*, and the *Penelope* placed themselves opposite Fort Meks and the works at Marsa-el-Kanat. Outside, the *Alexandra*, the *Sultan*, and *Superb* prepared to attack the Ras-el-Tin works, together with the Pharos Castle and Fort Aida, while the *Inflexible* and *Temeraire* took charge of the *Corvette* and *Bourgas* passes ready to support either the division within or that without the harbour. At 7 o'clock in the morning the first gun was fired by the *Alexandra*. It is related by officers of the fleet that the sailors sat or stood listening with eager intensity for the reply, and fearing that at the last moment the enemy might yield without fighting. But that reply came in the shape of a mighty burst of artillery fire. The sailors were satisfied, and the fleet settled down to the first serious action which it has experienced since the bombardment of Sebastopol. The results of a struggle between modern ironclads and forts armed with modern guns had never been clearly shown, and, while on the one side, the officers of the English fleet talked of quelling the fire




FORT PHAROS DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.

of the forts in 20 minutes, on the other side, Arabi expressed his belief that the ships would be sunk in about the same time. The result disappointed both prophecies. The ships were chiefly struck by round shot, the power of which was insufficient to penetrate them at any vital part, while the Egyptian gunners continued to man their guns with a courage which would be worthy of the highest admiration if the statement that they were prevented from running away by infantry drawn up in the rear of them is not founded upon fact. In about an hour and-a-half a magazine in Marsa-el-Kanat blew up, and one by one the other forts were overpowered. But even at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, ten hours after the commencement of the bombardment, the Egyptian guns were not all silenced. In the early part of the action the two broadside ships—*Invin-*



THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.—H.M.S. ALEXANDRA IN THE THICK OF THE ENGAGEMENT

cible and Penelope—were at anchor, while their consort in the outer harbour—the Monarch—was under steam, as was also the division at sea containing the Alexandra, Superb, and Sultan. It is usually understood that ships of war when engaging forts should remain in motion, thus continually altering their distance from the enemy, and so throwing out his aim. But, during the bombardment of Alexandria it was found that the motion of the vessels deranged the fire of their guns more than it did that of the enemy, and the Monarch, as also the sea squadron, anchored. The Temeraire touched ground in the central pass before the ships opened fire, but her barbette guns were still able to support the inner squadron, while the Inflexible directed the fire of two of the 80-ton guns upon the Ras-el-tin works, and two upon those of Fort Meks. As the fight proceeded the forts within the harbour first gave up the contest, and a landing party of volunteers was sent on shore to destroy or render useless the guns in Fort Meks. Six were spiked and two destroyed by the explosion of gun cotton. In returning, the men and officers had to swim, but arrived safely on board ship. In the early part of the afternoon the Inflexible left her position in the Corvette Pass and steamed round to a station north-east of the sea squadron, and the Temeraire, having been afloat since 8 o'clock, joined her. The 80-ton guns of the




H.M.S. INFLEXIBLE.

Inflexible had produced comparatively little effect upon the earthworks, but when brought to bear upon masonry the result was prodigious. Against guns mounted behind earth without embrasures or carriages of the disappearing system neither the Inflexible nor the other ships produced much effect. On the whole, it was considered by experts that the results of the naval artillery fire were at least as great as could be reasonably expected, and, on the whole, though the forts were in the end almost completely silenced, the action is held to demonstrate that, supposing the artillery on both sides to be equal and the gunners equally skilful, a fleet of the best ironclads now afloat will achieve no greater results in a duel with forts than did the wooden ships which bombarded Sebastopol. Against an inferior artillery ironclads are all-powerful.

But it would seem that in the race between armour and guns the latter have distinctly the advantage. The ordnance carried by each ship which is placed on the water is capable of piercing her own armour.

The views of those who advocate the use of smaller wooden ships instead of the ponderous ironclads, which, if they sink, carry so large a proportion of the fleet's strength to the bottom, received illustration, if not confirmation, by the action of the gunboats. As the fire from Fort Marabout was annoying the in-shore squadron the gunboat Condor, commanded by Lord Charles Beresford, ran up within range of the


LOWER EGYPT.



fort and opened fire, taking care always to present as small a mark as possible to the adversary. The temerity of the Condor received its reward ; the little vessel was not once hit by heavy shot, and, together with a mosquito fleet of gunboats which afterwards joined her, succeeded in silencing Fort Marabout. The results of this action inspired more respect for the enemy than the future progress of the war has shown that he deserved. But it would appear that throughout the campaign the fire of the Egyptian Artillery has always been better than that of the Infantry.

The Conference at Constantinople had been sitting since the 23rd of June, and though events precipitated this bombardment, not a single battalion had been directed upon Alexandria, either from England or the Mediterranean. Nor had it been anticipated that the Egyptian garrison would evacuate the town in disorder, leaving it a prey to flames kindled by the soldiers and convicts whom they let loose. Among

many advantages, the ironclad fleets suffer from one disadvantage. The number of hands, including seamen and marines, on board those ponderous vessels is not sufficient to spare armed men for an expedition on shore. There followed, therefore, upon the bombardment this deplorable result, that the flying soldiers of Arabi could not



BLUE JACKETS AND MARINES CLEARING THE STREETS.

be followed and broken up, and that not until they were clear from the place was it possible to undertake the task of suppressing disorder. The Khedive, who, with the greatest courage and good faith, had remained loyal to his English allies, but refused to leave his Egyptian people, narrowly escaped by obtaining the goodwill of the detachment which Arabi had placed over him as guard. Tewfik was found in safety on the morning after the bombardment and was placed in charge of a force of Marines. By degrees other Marines and Blue-jackets were landed, the gates by which the enemy had left the town were occupied, and vigorous measures taken to restore order. Plunderers and murderers caught red-handed were shot or flogged, and the determination of the English continued until the terror rooted among the Egyptians by the bombardment enabled a force of about 1,000 men to hold the town for some days. The bombardment had taken place on the 11th, and, except small reinforcements of Marines, no troops arrived at Alexandria till the 18th, when the 1st South Stafford-

shire and the 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps made their appearance, having come from Malta by way of Cyprus ; and no other reinforcement of troops took place until July 24, the day on which the Vote of Credit was demanded in Parliament. Up to the time of the bombardment, and even after it, until the 21st of July, there was no movement of troops from England, even to the Mediterranean, much less to Alexandria, except on July 8, after the Admiral's first *ultimatum*, when the 1st North Lancashire and the 2nd Essex sailed from this country to Gibraltar.

From the foregoing details and observations it will be seen that in the first place the revolt of the Egyptian army was due to no grand national movement pushing the hearts and the actions of men beyond the trammels of law, but to a selfish resistance on the part of the officers to reforms which were really for the benefit of the country ; and, further, that the British Government were perfectly loyal in their desire to work in harmony with Europe. So far as English military forces were concerned, no movements of any kind were made such as could be construed as threats until the bombardment, which was rendered necessary by the menacing attitude of Arabi, had taken place, and the sailors and Marines had perforce been landed in order to prevent the entire destruction of a famous city illustrative both of ancient and modern civilization.

The first massacre at Alexandria, on the 11th of June, greatly irritated the English people, but more serious thoughts were aroused by the information that on the 25th, two days after the first meeting of the Conference, the Sultan honoured Arabi with an order of distinction. The bombardment and its results, the loyalty of the Khedive (whom it was felt we could not desert), and the supineness of the other Powers removed the situation from the regions of diplomacy and proved to the Government that war was inevitable. On the 8th of July, two days after Sir Beauchamp Seymour sent in his first ultimatum, the 1st South Staffordshire and the 3rd King's Royal Rifles were moved from Malta to Cyprus in order to be at hand, if required. On the same day



A MARINE SENTRY.

the 1st North Lancashire and the 2nd Essex left England for Gibraltar, and the 1st Berkshire were pushed on from Gibraltar to Malta. This was the commencement of a series of movements within the Mediterranean, which continued almost uninterruptedly until the despatch of the main force from England. The two battalions from Malta, despatched on the 8th, arrived at Cyprus on the 13th and at Alexandria on the 18th, and were the first British Infantry regiments which landed in Egypt to support the sailors and Marines. Some amusement was created by the statement of Mr. Gladstone in the House that while these things were in progress we were not at war. But the Prime

Minister was technically quite right in his statement of fact. Even when the country is in a state of profound peace it is not unusual to hear of one or more of Her Majesty's ships having bombarded a sea-coast town to exact reparation for injuries to British subjects. Yet no one considers that we are on that account at war with the nation. The movements in the Mediterranean were precautionary, and every battalion which at first landed at Alexandria was drawn there by the necessity of facts which presented themselves from day to day. Yet the only troops landed at Alexandria before the vote of credit was passed consisted of the two battalions just named, which moved from Gibraltar *via* Cyprus; the 2nd Cornwall, which moved from Gibraltar on the 14th of July and arrived at Alexandria on the 24th; one battery of garrison artillery, and a half battalion of the 1st




GROUP OF THE KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS.

Sussex which, starting from Malta on the 20th, arrived at Alexandria on the 24th. It was felt at this time throughout the country that war was being forced upon an unwilling Government, which was, however strong enough to be trusted with conducting it in a business-like manner. All attempts at political agitation collapsed with extraordinary rapidity, and when on July 24 a vote of credit was asked for in the House the people of England were practically unanimous in their readiness to grant the request. On the 25th Her Majesty issued a proclamation calling out the Reserves; on the 27th the Vote of Credit was passed;


on the 29th the French Chamber refused to sanction a small vote, timidly brought forward by the Government of M. de Freycinet, and by doing so freed the hands of England. Next day, the 30th of July, the 1st Scots Guards sailed from England for Alexandria—the head of a column of ships and regiments which from that time until the occupation of the canal on the 20th day of August, never ceased to stream towards its ultimate point of destination. It may be interesting to remark for future information that the 1st Scots Guards, which left England on the 30th of July, arrived at Alexandria on the 10th of August. From the departure of the head of the column on the 30th of July to the despatch of the 2nd Royal Irish, which was the last battalion of the original force sent out, was 12 days, and that battalion arrived at Alexandria on the 21st, thus completing the whole operation from the beginning in 23 days, including the day of first departure and that of last arrival.

But the despatch of actual guns and bayonets formed only a small portion of the work which had to be done. In addition to these, the various departments which are as necessary to an army as the fighting troops themselves had to be despatched from England or the Mediterranean. Field hospitals and ambulances, the veterinary department, bearer companies for



BLUE JACKETS PLACING GUNS IN POSITION.


carrying the wounded from the field, commissariat and transport to keep the troops alive, a postal department to facilitate communication with home, ammunition columns to provide food for the weapons, a pontoon troop to enable the forces to cross the many streams which intersect Egypt, a telegraph troop by means of which the country has been kept informed of the military operations from day to day—nay, almost from hour to hour—a field park, containing, among other things, wagons which carried printing apparatus, a railway company, military police, ordnance store department, together with an enormous siege train, which was soon found useful at Alexandria—all these served to swell the dimensions of an army which would have been crippled by the want of any one of them. It is worth attention that this is the first occasion on which a considerable English military force has been



RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE OF THE ENEMY'S POSITION AT KAPRDOWAR, AUGUST 5TH

sent out thoroughly equipped, with the sole exception of transport animals; and those who have contended against the reorganization of the Army may perhaps now acknowledge that the measures of the last decade have not been thrown away. The strength of battalions varied from 861 non-commissioned officers and rank and file in the case of the 2nd Royal Irish, the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's, and the whole of the 4th Brigade, to 767 in some regiments and 761 in others. But this does not include the depots and drafts which were forwarded shortly afterwards, and intended not only to keep up the strength of the regiments in the field, but even to raise them if considered necessary. Of the cavalry sent, the 4th Dragoon Guards numbered 452 sabres, and the 7th Dragoon Guards 573. Each battery of artillery had six guns, 124 non-commissioned officers and men, and 153 horses, the Horse Artillery batteries being somewhat stronger. The force originally despatched from this side of the Canal included about 1,010 officers and

21,200 non-commissioned officers and men, with 54 field guns, 2,600 horses, and 500 pack animals. Besides this last small contingent of pack animals, great exertions had been made to procure mules throughout the world, but this was the one point on which English organization for the despatch of an army corps had not been completed. We drew attention to



BRITISH POSITION AT RAMLEH.

the fault some time before it manifested itself in practice, but there is no teaching like the logic of facts, and no doubt the Government will now take such measures as will prevent the recurrence of any weakness of the kind in future operations. The reinforcements which were prepared after the despatch of the corps amounted to 280 officers and 10,800 men, so that the total force which had been despatched, or was in the act of being despatched at the end of the war, from Great Britain and the Mediterranean stations amounted to 1,290 officers and 32,000 men. The Indian Contingent, including a small reserve left at Aden, consisted of 170 officers and 7,100 men, thus completing a grand total of 40,560 officers and men of all ranks for the expeditionary force. Some of these, consisting of depots

and drafts and one infantry battalion, were stopped at the last moment, but on the whole not far short of 40,000 men were sent.

The troops despatched from India were two English battalions—the 1st Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Manchester—two Bengal and one Bombay battalions of Native Infantry, with one 9-pounder field battery and one mountain battery, each of six guns, and three regiments of Bengal Cavalry, with some sappers and miners from Madras. The force was accompanied by about 3,500 followers, including transport drivers, 1,700 horses, 840 ponies, and nearly 5,000 mules, some for regimental and others for general transport purposes. They carried with them a month's provisions for the sea voyage, and three months' for the land campaign. The first battalion despatched from India was the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, which left Bombay on July 22, and landed at Suez on August 8. The rest of the force received their orders about July 24, and began to leave Bombay on August 5. The bulk of the Indian Contingent arrived in the Canal by degrees while the operations for securing the base at Ismailia were in progress. Two battalions of native infantry were left at Aden as a reserve.


During the days which elapsed after the bombardment and before the arrival of the two battalions of Infantry from England the small force under the hand of Sir Beauchamp Seymour was fully occupied in restoring order in the town and holding the principal gates to guard against a possible return of Arabi's insurgents.

One good piece of work was, however, done by the sailors in anticipation of future operations. A locomotive engine and trucks, which had, fortunately, been captured when the town was occupied, was converted into an ironclad train, upon which was mounted a 40-pounder gun, which was either part of the siege train sent on from Malta or was landed from the ships. During these first days Arabi had his first chance; he might have returned to Alexandria with the best force he could muster and vigorously attacked the few men who were occupied in guarding the town. Had he done so he would probably have been aided by an insurrection of



NATIVE INDIAN INFANTRY.

the malcontents within the city. He let the opportunity slip by and contented himself with occupying the neck of land between the lakes of Mareotis and Aboukir. At this time he appears to have been gathering together, often by force, a large number of the fellaheen from various parts of Egypt, some of whom had borne arms in the army of Ismail. These levies seem to have been at first assembled chiefly in the neighbourhood of Damanhour, with outposts at Kafrdawar. It was impossible for the English to advance without leaving the city behind them an undefended prey to Arab fanaticism. The Egyptians have always been noted as being clever in the use of the spade, and they soon began to throw up trenches and form a defensive position at Kafrdawar. Sir Archibald Alison, who was the first military officer of rank to arrive on the scene of action pushed out a reconnoissance on the evening of August 5. Six companies of the King's Royal Rifles, four companies of the South Staffordshire, and four of the Duke of Cornwall's advanced on the left; seven companies of marines and the ironclad train, under Captain Fisher, moved on the right. The value of training in small tactical manœuvres at home at once declared itself, for the men worked with great steadiness and carefulness over the ground which intervened between the English position at



THE IRONCLAD TRAIN.

Ramleh and that of the Egyptians at Kafrdawar. If the reconnoissance brought not much information as to the general strength of the enemy, it proved, at least, the immense superiority of the English soldiers over their opponents, not only in courage, but even in shooting, a superiority as marked, so far as rifle fire is concerned, as that of the Boers over our troops in the Transvaal. Sir Archibald only lost four men, while the enemy lost men and *morale* at once, a great many of them throwing away their arms and accoutrements and dispersing rapidly in the jungle. There was an impression in England that Sir A. Alison should have followed up his successes at this time and attacked Arabi in the field. Nothing could have been more unfortunate than such a movement. The Egyptians would probably have retreated and the English could not possibly have followed them. The situation would then have appeared in

the eyes of the natives as if we had made an advance and been obliged to retreat. Even as it was, the reconnoissance was magnified by Arabi into a battle, and Cairo was full of the news that the advancing British had been repulsed. From that day onwards a series of unimportant engagements took place, which had the effect of impressing the English troops with a sense of their own power and of depressing the spirits of the Egyptians, who continued to fortify themselves at Kafrdawar and subsequently at Meks, thus guarding against our advance by the western shore of Lake Mareotis. The same tactics of defence and counter-defence have proceeded ever since until the surrender, the advantage to our side being that some 20,000 of Arabi's best troops have been detained in front of Alexandria instead of taking part in the critical struggle on the banks of the Canal or at Tel-el-Kebir.

But more interesting and serious events were about to occur. On the 10th of August




MOUNTED INFANTRY.

Sir John Ayde, Chief of the Staff, arrived at Alexandria with the Duke of Connaught, whose soldierlike feeling would not permit him to remain inactive at home, during this the first considerable war of his time. The whole of his brigade of Guards appeared within the next two days, and astonished the people of Alexandria by their martial appearance. Their march to Ramleh, whence they were so

soon to return, was doubtless described to Arabi, and would tend to impress him with the idea that at that point the chief struggle of the war would take place. On the 11th the cable to Port Said was completed, and telegraphic communication made with the entrance to the Canal. Troops were now pouring in fast. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had suffered from fever before leaving England, and had been advised to make the journey by sea, arrived at Alexandria on August 15, five days after his Staff, and the Khedive at once issued decrees giving full power to the British to undertake operations and occupy the country. On the 16th Sir Garnet landed, and on the 17th ordered the embarkation of such parts of the 1st Division as were already on shore. The troops embarked on the 18th, and the same day the English Parliament adjourned. It was known that Alexandria was full of spies, who reported every rumour to the Egyptian leader. Sir

Garnet therefore proclaimed openly that the destination of the troops was the Bay of Aboukir, where they were to land after a naval bombardment of the forts. The fleet and transports sailed on the 19th, and made a demonstration opposite the forts at Aboukir. The gunners in the shore batteries stood to their guns, and the British men-of-war had struck their topmasts as if in preparation for a fight. But when night fell the whole magnificent column moved in stately procession towards the East. It has been remarked with some surprise that the ships showed their lights, but this was probably to guard against the very serious danger of collision. Moreover, it was now too late

THE COUNTRY AROUND ALEXANDRIA.



for any movement on the part of the Egyptian army which might prevent the occupation of the canal. For on that same night, according to previous instructions, Port Said, Kantara, and Ismailia were seized by detachments detailed by the Port Said section of the fleet, and early the next morning the Seaforth Highlanders, who had




TROOPS DISEMBARKING.

arrived from India on the 8th, moved from Suez to Chalouf and saved the Freshwater Canal at that point. The Egyptians were in a work which they had constructed, but their rifle practice was so bad that, while they lost heavily, the Highlanders hardly suffered at all. Two men were wounded and two drowned in crossing the Canal. It has been stated by M. de Lesseps that unnecessary roughness and violence were shown in the occupation of Ismailia, but the reports of officers engaged in the transaction prove clearly that a force of the enemy actually occupied the outskirts of the town, and the firing which took place was, therefore, not without reason. Daylight on the 20th saw the Canal in full occupation of the Navy and the 1st Division at Port Said. On the 21st the disembarkation at Ismailia was in full process. But the whole force in the Canal at that time consisted only of seven squadrons of cavalry, one battery of horse, and one of field artillery, and seven battalions of infantry, besides a small portion of the Indian contingent, consisting of a detachment of cavalry and a battalion and a half of infantry, who were partly at Suez, partly at Chalouf and Serapeum. On the 22nd the disembarkation of the 1st Division was completed, and other troops began to arrive rapidly in the Canal. On this day, also, the head of the Indian column, of which the Seaforth Highlanders might be considered as the advance guard, made its appearance in the Canal. The troops on landing found that their water supply had been cut off by the erection of dams across the Canal, and Sir Garnet immediately pushed on with an advanced guard under General Graham to seize and destroy the obstructions to the flow of water. On the 24th, before daylight, the Household Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion York and Lancaster, a few Mounted Infantry, and a detachment of Marines, with two 13-pounders of the Horse Artillery, moved out from camp and came in contact with a strong body of the enemy posted

in the neighbourhood of Tel-el-Mahuta. The Egyptian infantry appeared to number about 10,000, and they had 12 guns in position against two English pieces. But the 13-pounders were superior in power and accuracy to the Krupp guns, and the English gunners under Lieutenant Hickman showed determined courage and great endurance under the burning sun. A few men of the Marine Artillery relieved at times the exhausted gunners, and the British Artillery warded off demonstrations of the Infantry, both in front and on the flanks, assisted by two Gatlings brought up by a detachment of bluejackets. Only once did the enemy approach near enough to

THE COUNTRY BETWEEN ISMAILIA AND ZAGAZIG.





TROOPS BIVOUACKING.

menace the infantry with immediate attack, and then the skirmishers were swept away by a charge of the Household Cavalry, three squadrons of which, each from a different regiment, had been sent to Egypt to represent Her Majesty's Mounted Guards. Reinforcements were sent for, and the enemy gave way for the time. The English bivouacked on the desert.

Next morning, the 25th, General Willis had brought up the whole of his division, and the cavalry brigade was present. It was perceived that the enemy were strongly entrenched at Tel-el-Mahuta, and a severe fight was expected. But the morning sun shone on deserted entrenchments and illumined the volumes of smoke sent out by engines dragging heavy trains full of Arabi's soldiers in retreat. The infantry were once more disappointed in their hope of a fight, but the plan of attack was carried out with advantage to the cavalry. The English left rested on the railway and Canal, the right was swung round to take the enemy's entrenchments in flank, and the Cavalry Brigade was directed to attack Arabi's force in the rear and endeavour to capture some of the trains which were at this time much needed by the British at the front, hungering for lack of transport to carry food to them. The English guns made an end of whatever hesitation still lingered in the hearts of the Egyptians, and a hasty retreat was made, almost too late. As the last trains were preparing to retire, the Cavalry Brigade swooped down on the village of Mahsameh, dashed into the railway station through flocks of flying Arab soldiers and succeeded in seizing several trains, the engines for which had unfortunately made their escape. The losses on our side were small—only 5 killed and 25 wounded, but the cases of sunstroke were numerous, the 4th Dragoon Guards losing 16 men from this cause, and the York and Lancaster 25 men.

So great was the apparent demoralization after this action that Sir Garnet considered himself justified in pushing a cavalry force forward to occupy Kassassin Lock, in advance of Mahuta, and the occupation was completed next day, the 26th, without opposition. Thus, to secure a supply of water it had been necessary to thrust



SIR GARNET WOLSELEY WATCHING THE ENGAGEMENT AT TEL-EL-MAHUTA.

forward a force into the heart of the desert not far short of 20 miles from the Canal at Ismailia. But how were the advanced troops to be supplied with food? At this time the force in Egypt began to feel the want of a proper organization for the instant provision of military transport in time of war, and at a time when prolonged exertion under a terrible sun had weakened the men, they were forced to live for two or three days on biscuits and muddy water flavoured only with the dead bodies of Egyptian men and horses. The horses also were short of forage, and candid friends on the Continent of Europe pointed to the one blot in our preparations, and prophesied the speedy downfall of English pride.

The general situation after the action at Mahsameh on the 25th of August and the occupation of Kassassin Lock next day was somewhat unusual. General Graham, with the Duke of Cornwall's and the York and Lancaster, about 400 Royal Marine Artillery, small detachments of the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards, amounting together



SENDING SUPPLIES UP THE FRESHWATER CANAL.

to little over 50 sabres, 70 Mounted Infantry, and 2 guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, held an advanced position at Kassassin Lock. General Drury-Lowe, with the Household Cavalry, the 7th Dragoon Guards, and the remaining four guns of the N Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, remained behind at Mahsameh, where also was a battalion of the Royal Marines. The Brigade of Guards, under the Duke of Connaught, was still further back at Tel-el-Mahuta, and part of it, perhaps even further to the rear. Throughout all these early days of the advance the Guards worked splendidly. It was impossible for them to be present at the action of the 24th, but they showed the stuff of which they were made by pressing forward through the heat of that day, arriving on the ground in the evening. On the 25th they were eager for fight, but the enemy refused the combat, and after that their spirit and good temper were shown by the hearty zeal with which they carried out the heavy duties of fatigue work, aiding by their strenuous labours the preparations for advance. It is not difficult to understand that the remarkable position of the troops, with, in front, a small advanced guard

amounting to less than 1,900 men all told, and two guns, the cavalry, except a few men for outpost work and orderlies, some three or four miles behind, and the rest of the force still further back, was due to the difficulty of conveying provisions and ammunition to the front. A general who believed the absurd stories which had been circulated with regard to the inefficiency of the existing British infantry would not have dared to have held such a position. But Sir Garnet Wolseley was not one of those birds of ill-omen who have rendered day and night hideous by their croakings on the supposed degeneracy of British recruits and British regiments. He believed in the courage and vigour of the army under his command, and the ability of the officers whom he had chosen as leaders of divisions and brigades. The result justified his confidence.

One day, the 27th of August, was allowed to pass without any action of interest, and was marked only by the arrival of a detachment of Turkish troops, said to be on their way to a station on the Red Sea. They were not allowed to land on the territory occupied by the English, though the Porte on that same day nominally accepted the



DESTROYING A DAM IN THE FRESH WATER CANAL.

terms of the Convention. About half-past 9 on the morning of the 28th the enemy commenced his first attempt to drive back the head of the British column by direct attack. The position of General Graham was not favourable for defence. His troops were astride of the Canal, and although a bridge existed, the separation of right and left wing was partial in any case, and complete if the force had either to advance or retire. Moreover, on the right of the position the desert rose to a ridge some 150 ft. high which might easily conceal the movements of an outflanking force. On the appearance of the enemy's cavalry General Graham posted his troops under cover, with front to the north and west, throwing out the cavalry and Mounted Infantry on the flanks. At the same time he warned General Drury-Lowe at Mahsaneh by heliograph. About 11 his scouts reported that the turning movement which was to be expected was taking place. A strong Egyptian force of all arms was moving round


behind the ridge to turn the right flank of the English. At 12 o'clock, the enemy, who was gradually learning from us the points in the game of war, opened fire with two heavy guns which he appears to have advanced along the railway upon trucks, but the range was long, about 4,000 yards, and the elevation given to the pieces was insufficient. The shot fell short, and, as was



THE YORK AND LANCASTER REGIMENT AT KASSASSIN.

usual with the Egyptian artillery, plunged sullenly in the sand. The attack was not pressed, and about 3 p.m. Captain Pigott, commanding the Mounted Infantry, reported that the Egyptians appeared to be retiring. General Graham, therefore, withdrew his men from their exposure to the sun, and General Drury-Lowe, who had brought his cavalry within two or three miles of the camp, returned to Mahsameh, having previously been requested by General Graham not to engage unnecessarily. At half-past 4 the enemy made a determined advance with a front of skirmishers extending for at least a mile, and endeavouring to overlap the left front of the English. His 12 guns supported the attack, and thoroughly searched our camp, wounding one officer in the house which had been General Graham's head-quarters but had been subsequently given up to the sick and wounded. Remembering that the attack of the enemy was being made on the north side of the Canal it is easy to understand General Graham's dispositions. He placed the Marine Artillery on the south bank of the Canal, where they could not be turned themselves, but could bring a flanking fire to bear on the enemy's advance. This manoeuvre might, however, have turned out disadvantageously if the Egyptian force had succeeded in enveloping the English right, for, in that case, the Marine Artillery would have had the rest of the advanced guard between it and the enemy with the Canal between them. In the centre the Duke of Cornwall's, 611 strong, were posted to the north of the Canal and about 800 yards back from the Marine Artillery. This infantry regiment extended three companies in fighting formation, with supports and reserves under cover of the railway embankment. The fighting line faced west by north and was continued on the right by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, with two-and-a-half companies,

the remainder being in support and reserve. Thus the disposition of the force was such as to face an attack from the north and west, while its left, on the other side of the Canal, was placed in Engineer fashion like the flank to the curtain of a bastion. The 800 yards interval between the Duke of Cornwall's and the Marine Artillery was partially occupied by the Mounted Infantry and the small force of the 4th Dragoon



THE KRUPP GUN TAKEN FROM THE EGYPTIANS.

Guards dismounted. On the right of all were the troop of the 7th Dragoon Guards and the two 13-pounders, with an additional two which had been sent forward from the rear. About this time, General Graham sent back a message to General Drury-Lowe saying that he could do no more than hold his own, and directed the cavalry to come up and attack the left of the enemy's skirmishers. At 5 o'clock reinforcements were perceived coming up to the Egyptians by train, and, at the same time, their cavalry appeared to be advancing on the right. The reserve company of the York and Lancaster was, therefore, deployed to meet the attack. For some time the 13-pounders were worked with great effect upon the enemy; but, unfortunately, the ammunition gave out and the guns had to cease firing. No wagons had been brought up by the guns which had joined during the fight, probably on account of the heavy nature of the soil, and the actions of the 24th and 25th had, no doubt, exhausted that which was originally with Lieutenant Hickman's guns. We seem to see here another danger created by want of sufficient transport. If the men could not be supplied with food it is not likely that the heavier ammunition was forwarded to them. Luckily, a Krupp gun, with its ammunition, had been taken at Mahsameh, and was now worked by a gun detachment of the Royal Marine Artillery with marked effect, 93 rounds being expended during the day. This detachment seemed to bear a charmed life. In front of it, beside it, and behind it fell shrapnel bullets and ragged morsels of shell fired in salvos by the Egyptian guns. But not a single man was hit during the engagement. The enemy continued to press the attack, especially striving to break through the gap

between the Marine Artillery and the infantry; but the Mounted Infantry and dismounted Dragoons vied with each other in steady resistance and good firing. The Egyptians were very determined, and even pushed detachments across the Canal, which was here 5ft. or 6ft. deep; but they were always driven back by the Marine Artillery. At a quarter to seven the enemy had been held back so long and so vigorously repulsed that General Graham judged that the moment had come for a counter attack. He believed, also, that by that time the cavalry charge must be taking place, though he knew nothing of what was actually occurring. Just after the order for advance had been given, the Royal Marine Light Infantry came up on the right from Mahsámeh and was directed to advance, together with the Duke of Cornwall's, which were on the left, the York and Lancaster being held in reserve. The enemy made little resistance, and the English foot soldiers advanced two or three miles, the enemy only standing once, when their resistance was overborne by a single volley of the Royal Marines. Not till 8.15 p.m. did General Graham hear of the magnificent and successful cavalry attack. The exact hour of that attack has not yet been given, but from various



LIFE GUARDS CHARGING.

reports which have reached us it would appear that the flanking movement had taken place about 7, and the cavalry was after that disposed in order for attack, delaying somewhat, so as to allow the fire from the Horse Artillery to prepare the way. Gliding along through the night, the Household Cavalry, 7th Dragoon Guards, and Horse Artillery kept the ridge between them and the enemy until it was time to charge. As they crossed the ridge they were perceived, and a heavy fire was opened upon them, but always too high. The front line cleared out of the way of the guns, which came into action within 400 yards and enfiladed the Egyptian lines. Sir Baker Russell, who commanded the brigade, then gave the order to charge, and took care not to remain behind till his horse was killed under him. Cuirassiers and Dragoons rushed on at full speed, swept through the Egyptian guns, and made great slaughter among the infantry. The guns were afterwards carried off by the enemy under cover of the night,

but the charge was a grand one and worthy of the reputation of the British cavalry. It will be seen by the details of this action how it came about that the infantry was supposed to be on the point of having to yield, when the cavalry charge took place. But it is equally evident that the supposition was wrong. Nothing could have been better or finer than the flank march and charge of the cavalry, and its fame stands on too firm a basis to be shaken by the undoubted fact that before its appearance the infantry had relinquished the defensive and commenced its counter attack, which was never checked. The total losses of the English were 11 killed or dangerously wounded, and others wounded, 68. The Marine Artillery and Mounted Infantry suffered most, being upon that part of the line upon which the fiercest attacks of the enemy were directed.

During the next few days little of interest occurred at the front. General Graham was reinforced, and on the 30th Sir Edward Hamley embarked at Alexandria with the 3rd Brigade, and sailed next day, the 31st.

The brigade was, however, retained on board ship off Ismailia, merely landing portions of the troops day by day to assist in the work which was going on at the base. The Indian contingent continued to arrive in the Canal, and the whole of the English staff were engaged with whatever troops and workmen they could put their hands upon in laying down a small branch railway from the station to the pier at Ismailia, and in landing engines, while the Naval Brigade placed launches on the Freshwater Canal and carried provisions, ammunition, and stores up to Kassassin Lock. The situation was clearing itself rapidly, and while a portion of public opinion, both at home and on the Continent, believed that the English force was checked, its commander was developing his plans for the attack of Tel-el-Kebir, the very spot on which before leaving England he had laid his finger as the scene of the critical battle of the war. By the 3rd the whole of the Indian contingent had arrived in the Canal, including the 1st Manchester, except the 6th Bengal Cavalry, which continued to arrive in detachments up to the 14th of September, one of its detachments having arrived as early as the 21st of August. On the




SEARCHING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR THE WOUNDED.



18. FOURTEEN ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY COMING INTO ACTION AT TEL-EL-MAHUTA.

THE COUNTRY ROUND TEL-EL-KEBIR.



5th the Sultan's Proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel was issued at Constantinople, and the Convention was initialled on the 6th, when orders were sent to prepare for the despatch of Turkish troops from Suda Bay. Slight reconnoissances were made once or twice by the enemy, and on the 9th Arabi made a reconnoissance in force, with which he was himself present. It was the anniversary of the original revolt, and we cannot but believe that something more than a reconnoissance was intended by the attack which was made both by about 8,000 men and 24 guns from the main body and a portion of the detachment which, with feeble strategy, Arabi had pushed out to the terminus at Salahieh. By this time the English were much too strong to be placed in the slightest jeopardy. In the artillery fire the two English batteries and the 40-pounder on its truck obtained a considerable advantage, and on this day especially was proved the great power of shrapnel as a man-killing projectile. Our loss

only another day to be killed and wounded, while the enemy suffered heavily. Four or five of the guns were captured, and the hotter spirits among the English were inclined to attribute want of vigour to Sir Garnet Wolseley because he refused to carry, on that day, the line of Tel-el-Kebir. The same accusation was often pressed against Wellington in the Peninsular War. If Sir Garnet Wolseley had allowed himself to have been carried away by the heat of the moment, he might, indeed, have entered the works but the Egyptian army would have remained a solid force still ready to dispute the way to Zagazig and Cairo. Not only was he strategically right to bide his time, but the delay probably saved the famous Egyptian city, with its monuments of antiquity which could never be replaced. At the time the action was fought the Guards were still at Mahuta, and the Highland Brigade, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, at least one battery of Artillery, with two squadrons of the 19th Hussars, and part of the Indian contingent were still at Ismailia. Nor were all the requisite provisions, ammunition, and stores at the front. But now all was ready for the advance. On the 9th, the day of the action, the head-quarters were established at the front. The Highland Brigade commenced its march. The Guards were brought up, and the whole force with which it was intended to strike was concentrated on the spot by the 11th. The men were allowed to rest for one day.

On the 11th and 12th Sir Garnet Wolseley reconnoitred the two sides of the enemy's position. He saw before him a line of entrenchments some four miles long, soft earthworks with hurdle revetments. At intervals along the line redoubts mounted with guns were placed to deliver both front and flanking fire and connected by trenches. In support of the front line were redoubts which were especially strong towards the right centre of the position, both because they crowned natural elevations and because they had been strengthened by art. The flanks were protected by similar works, an intrenched front line and redoubts. They were probably unassailable by cavalry. Behind these works lay an Egyptian force, the strength of which can only be estimated



THE BENGAL LANCERS AT KASSASSIN.



by the fact that 18,000 rations were issued the day before for the regular troops, and 7,000 for irregulars. But the strength of his enemy was only known vaguely to Sir Garnet Wolseley. The practical facts before him were—the works, the knowledge that they were fully occupied, the knowledge also of a detachment at Salahieh, and the certainty that the enemy would be informed of all his movements by spies. The experience of an Egyptian sun on the desert sands had shown that though English troops could fight and conquer in the heat of the day, the hard task be-



STRIKING CAMP.

fore them had better be performed in the cool hours of the morning. To save his troops, to deceive the prying eyes of the enemy, and to seize the best moment for an assault, Sir Garnet decided to move under cover of the night and commence his attack before daylight. Accordingly, at nightfall on the 12th, the camp was broken up, tents struck, packed, and placed in order, and availing itself of the absence of moonlight, the force moved silently forward in the order chosen for attack. After proceeding a short distance, the men bivouacked, no light nor fire being allowed. At half-past one the men rose from their sandy couches and advanced with less difficulty than is to be expected in night marches. There was some wandering astray, but, on the whole, the movement was steady. The total strength present was 11,000 bayonets, 2,000 sabres, and 60 guns, about half that of the enemy, excluding the Salahieh detachment. On the right marched the bulk of the Cavalry Brigade, and two Horse Artillery batteries, with orders to sweep round to the rear of the enemy's line at daylight. Next to them on the left, and forming the right of the infantry, was General Graham's Brigade, supported by the Duke of Connaught and his Guards. Nearer to the railway and canal moved 42 guns under Colonel Goodenough, supported by a fourth brigade made up the day before from the King's Royal Rifles and the Duke of Cornwall's, and with them apparently were the Marine Light Infantry. On the same side of the railway and canal was the bulk of the Highland Brigade, under Sir Archibald Alison, and on the south of the canal such of the Indian contingent as were upon the ground, the

1st Manchester having been left at Ismailia and detachments of other regiments dropped on the line of communications. With them also must have been a portion of the Indian cavalry. The Ironclad train occupied the railway, supported and manned by 250 blue-jackets who had been drawn from the ships and sent to the front to share in the last great duty and final satisfaction. Official details are still wanting to prove exactly the course of the fight, but in the meantime the various accounts which have reached this country leave little doubt as to the general course of the battle.

The Highland Brigade on our left and Graham's Brigade on our right stole forward through the darkness to the assault of the enemy's position. Knowing the effect produced by the sudden apparition of a brave enemy determined to charge, Sir Garnet decided to have no preliminary fire, but to trust only to the shadows of the night to veil his advance. It is said that the men were ordered not even to load if it could possibly be avoided, and, in any case, to close with the foe, and, breast to breast, decide the struggle with the bayonet. On both flanks the British attacking forces came within short distances of the enemy before they were perceived. Dawn was faintly creeping up the eastern sky when the crest of a ridge some 500 yards in front of the Egyptian left became covered with moving objects telling black against the pale light. It was Graham's Brigade advancing. Then a single shot from the Egyptian lines rang out in the stillness of the morning, and immediately the whole front of the position was broken by jets of red flame from rifle and cannon. It would seem that at this moment the rest of the troops down in the shadows of the plain had not been perceived, and that the fire was of that involuntary sort which tells of want of steady discipline. For a moment the Brigade on the hill gazed upon the enemy at its feet, upon the dark lines of the earthworks with their fringe of flame. Then, with a grand cheer, the tide of British lads was let loose, and the blood of the men bounded no less strongly in their veins because their service in the Army was to be six years instead of twelve. But, as in this part of the field the English soldiers had been seen by the



NIGHT MARCH ACROSS THE DESERT.



THE CHARGE OF THE IRISHOLD CAVALRY AT KARRIST

enemy, they were subjected to a hail of bullets. The Egyptian infantry clustered thickly on the parapets of the redoubts and poured down the slopes into the trenches. Hundreds of them, lying down plied the head of the advancing brigade with fire. The young soldiers deployed with perfect steadiness and advanced by sections, alternately lying down to fire and making short rushes towards the enemy's position, always under full control of their officers. As they came near the trenches they gathered themselves together, and, without an instant's hesitation, leaped into the midst of the enemy. Bayonet and butt were plied with deadly effect, and the second line, rushing down to join their comrades, found the trenches full of dead and wounded Arabs. The first line of the Egyptian defences was captured, with its redoubts. A stronger fort lay behind, still occupied heavily by the enemy and armed with 12 guns. Line after line of shelter trenches stood further on. To have stopped at this time would have been to re-enact the mistake of the Redan in the Crimea. The men cheered again, climbed the mount

and the parapet of the fort, and bayoneted the gunners at their guns. A quarter of an hour or twenty minutes from the first great rush after the firing advance sufficed to place the intrenchments, with their supporting redoubts, in the hands of the English troops. Those of the enemy who were able fled, followed by the fire of the troops in the captured positions, and though other redoubts as yet unattacked fired for awhile, the threat of the English cavalry coming behind caused them to be suddenly evacuated.

Towards the left of the British line the Highlanders advanced with a steadiness not to be surpassed. Not a shot was fired until they were within 300 yards of the enemy's position, and then came that burst of flame which had broken out at once along the whole Egyptian line. But at this point the enemy fired wildly. The Highlanders cheered and dashed forward to the shrill music of their pipes. The first line of intrenchments was carried with a rush, and the men found themselves in presence of a second line, which had to be carried. Like their comrades on the right during



COLD STEEL.

the first advance, the Highlanders pushed on for a time slowly and firing steadily, then cheered again, and rushed into the inner redoubt. The resistance of the Egyptians failed from that moment, and the battle was virtually over—the battle, but not the pursuit. The Egyptian regiments, mingled together in one wild and disastrous retreat, had no rest given to them,



CAVALRY DISPERSING THE ENEMY.

no chance of rallying for a moment, for now it was the turn of the cavalry, which sweeping round from the north, cut to pieces the tide of fugitives. The same gallant spirit and events of the same character were seen in other parts of the field. The 4th Brigade attacked boldly and suffered heavy losses, and the artillery did its part with its usual devotion. But the battle was won in an old-fashioned way, suitable to the requirements of the case. If new occasions demand new means, old occasions demand the old means of the bayonet and the sabre. In former action the artillery and cavalry had been chiefly conspicuous. The battle of Tel-el-Kebir was won by the infantry.

Nor was any chance of rallying allowed to the beaten enemy. The guns in the redoubts were turned against their former masters, and with astonishing swiftness portions of the British Artillery bounded over intervening ditches and parapets into the heart of the position and crushed the terrified masses by shrapnel fire, causing the accumulations of men to burst asunder and fly in all directions.

Not a moment was lost. Straight over the battlefield the Indian contingent pressed the flying foe and moved swiftly upon Zagazig. It was joined by a battalion of Highlanders at or near Abou Essen, and together they occupied Zagazig that afternoon. The bulk of the Cavalry division and the Mounted Infantry, having cut through the flying masses, moved south-west by the desert road upon Belbais, which it occupied, after a slight skirmish, that evening, the guns, however, and the heavy cavalry being somewhat delayed by obstacles on the route. This force occupied Cairo next evening, the 14th, after a splendid march of 39 miles under the blazing Egyptian sun, saving the town from destruction, which had been threatened, and




capturing Arabi himself, who remains a prisoner in our hands. On the 14th, also, Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Head-quarters Staff, and a company of Scots Guards, with the Duke of Connaught, moved on to Zagazig by train; thence next day, the 15th, to Benha and Cairo, entering the capital, amid the acclamations of the people, accompanied by detachments of Guards, Highlanders, and Marines.

Having now sketched the general course of the war, as well as that of the events which led to it, it only remains to point to some of the military questions which have been illustrated and partially cleared up by the incidents of the campaign.

The first point worthy of attention is the proof which has now been afforded that the reorganization of the army carried on during some twelve years past has been moving in the right direction, though we are far from saying that it can be considered as complete. The changes which have been taking place have not been confined, as some people suppose, to those outward and visible signs on which so vast an amount of argument has been expended. Purchase was not abolished for a freak, but because the vested rights of the officers in their commissions gave them, like the Egyptian colonels, too great power over the general organization of the army. Measures which


were considered vital to the welfare of the land forces were subjected to a hostile and sometimes successful opposition. The country had to buy its army back from the purchase officers before thorough reorganization could be possible. Again, short service was not introduced because it was practised by the Germans or by any other nation, but because under the system of long service and pensions the army was actually dying out by degrees. Recruits could not be found to supply the whole of the annual vacancies. The army was below its strength, and gradually falling lower and lower, and while there was no effective and trained Reserve, the line battalions themselves were actually beginning to fade away. Another point about the long service system remains to be noticed. Under it, in conjunction with the purchase of commissions, there had grown up an excellent body of non-commissioned officers, who



SURRENDER OF ARABI.

practically managed the regiments. There was nothing to be said against them as a body, except what was actually said by one of them on a certain occasion in Dublin—"Yes, sir, the colonel and all the officers are away. In fact, only for the name of the thing, we might as well have no officers at all." The officers were then, as now, a most gallant body of men; gentlemanlike in peace, and quite ready to run their heads against any brick wall in war. But they were not professionals. A dying

THE COUNTRY BETWEEN ZAGAZIG AND CAIRO.



army with amateur officers, such was the military situation when short service was introduced.

The objections to the change were manifold, but they might all in principle be reduced to these, that the loss of the old non-commissioned officers and old soldiers would throw upon the officers burdens to which they had not been accustomed, and that the appearance of the battalions in peace would not be so fine, because they would lack the leaven of the old soldiers. No doubt the peculiar constitution of the British Empire, burdened with the honourable weight of India and the colonies, prevented the thorough development of a homogeneous short service system, such as that of the Germans, but this difficulty could be arranged, as it has now been, by a little give and take. The real objections were those which we have named. The army having been repurchased from the officers, the task before successive Governments was to attract recruits, to create a Reserve, and, while endeavouring to retain a sufficiently good class of non-commissioned officers, to train the officers, and make them, if not masters, at least students, of their profession. No measures are perfect; and we hold the opinion that in some directions the War Office has not gone far enough, and in others, especially that of making so much of the military instruction and examination extra-regimental, it has been led too far by doctrinaires. But, on the whole, when we look at the army of to-day and compare it with what it was a few years ago, we find the raw material both of officers and men at least as good in quality as formerly, while, including the Reserve, there is much more of it. All ranks now enter upon a campaign with some previous knowledge of what they are about and what special duties are required of them. There is none of the blind ignorance which formerly existed, and the military arts which were then known only to the few are now the common possession of the whole army. If Sir Garnet Wolseley has shown great skill in fence and boldness in attack he will be the first to acknowledge that the weapon which he wielded was better balanced and of finer temper and polish than was ever before ready to the hand of English Generals.



THE CITADEL, CAIRO.

The process of Army reform has been gradual, but has always proceeded on the lines laid down by its original advocates and designers. The idea was first to have at the head of the list for active service a few regiments completely or nearly able to take the field without disordering other battalions ; secondly, to keep the remainder of the battalions at a lower strength and acting chiefly as training schools for a reserve ; thirdly, to create that reserve by passing as large a number of men as possible through the ranks ; and lastly, to keep the Army up to a certain *minimum* strength, without which the other reforms could only be half carried out and the reserve would never reach its full development. Unfortunately, the design was but half understood by Parliament and the country, and the very first year after the introduction of the measures saw the Army reduced considerably below the *minimum*. Mr. Childers, first of all



BURYING PARTIES, TEL-EL-KEBIR.

Ministers of War since the commencement of the reforms, has thoroughly grasped the conditions of the case, and found favour enough with the Treasury to be allowed to carry out the necessary measures. The great mismanagement which at the time of the Zulu and Afghan wars brought the army into contempt could never have occurred if the steps lately taken by the War Office had been anticipated by a few years ; and even now the full working of the measures has not been attained. Some faults of organizations of battalions are still apparent, but in another year they will have disappeared. The battalions which until lately were never retained at full strength were being filled, but it is evident that more than six months was necessary to produce a full complement of seasoned men, and it ought to be understood that the small defects at which hypercritics will still carp, are the remnants of the old system, not samples of the new. If, as was shown in *The Times* of September 23rd in an article on the Army Reserve, the present organization had been in existence for a year, or even six months, the battalions ordered for service would, after dropping their recruits, have been able to take 800 men each into the field, without any of the Reserve. It is well to keep the

elders of the Reserve for great occasions, but it is satisfactory to find that out of 11,650 of the younger Reserve men called up by the Government, no less than 11,030 came at the call, and of the rest the absence of 135 was satisfactorily accounted for. Out of the 11,030, only 1,500 were required for the regiments going on service from home and the Mediterranean, and out of the rest depots were formed and other organizations completed. About 2,550 remained in hand to complete a third division if it had been required; and there were still at their homes some 15,000 Reserve men, whose services were never required at all. Every unprejudiced mind will recognize that a vast improvement is here perceptible over the organization which resulted in the Crimean catastrophes. We desire to speak in all modesty of the military organization of the country, which will, indeed, bear much more improvement; but the complicated needs of England with her Indian and colonial empires forbid the simple combinations which are all-sufficient for Germany or Austria, and forbid also conscription, with its huge production and false appearance of economy. Considering the recent expedition to Egypt as a combined movement by sea and land from two different hemispheres, involving on land movements of extraordinary rapidity under torrid heat, and at sea the necessity of complete protection against strong naval Powers which might at any time have become enemies, we are justified in saying that no other Power could have acted with equal freedom, equal rapidity, and equal success. The Imperial organization has shown itself suitable for the probable requirements of the Empire.

The expedition as a whole serves to illustrate a power which is not even yet recognized in its full extent—the power, namely, of moving large bodies of troops by sea to unknown destinations with a rapidity and certainty of concentration impossible for forces acting on land. The difference between the power of steam and sails may be seen by an apt comparison. On the 19th of May, 1798, Napoleon I. set sail from Toulon with favouring winds. He reached Malta, on his way to Egypt, on the 16th of June, thus occupying 28 days on



CAVALRY MARCHING ON CAIRO.


that short voyage. The head of the column of English steamers left England on the 30th of July, and reached Alexandria on the 10th of August, completing the voyage in 11 days. Here is a measure of speed. And for certainty of execution, we have only to remember that more than one invasion of England from the other side of the Channel has been delayed and spoilt by contrary winds, while the transports which



ARABI'S PRISON AT CAIRO.

lately went to Alexandria arrived for the most part on the very day calculated for each of them. All Europe knew their places at any given day, and almost every hour. Nelson, seeking the French flotilla in 1798, arrived at Alexandria before it, and then, sailing northwards, crossed its path within 15 miles during the night, and remained in ignorance of its arrival till the 25th of July, though the French had disembarked on the 1st of the same month. It was the 1st of August before the English fleet arrived off Aboukir, thus, from pure lack of information, leaving Napoleon the whole month of July to work his will in Egypt. Much has been made of the rapidity of the French invasion in Egypt, but Napoleon only entered Cairo on the 23rd of July, having left Toulon on the 19th of May. Sir Garnet Wolseley left England on the 2nd of August, made the whole voyage round Gibraltar, arrived at Alexandria on the 15th, and entered Cairo a conqueror on the 15th of September. Such are the facilities afforded by steam and the telegraph for a force which undertakes the invasion of an enemy's country. Surely the lesson of this is that it is more than ever necessary to be prepared on shore against the descent of an enemy by sea.

Turning from general considerations to those which are more strictly technical, the first thought in the mind of every soldier must be how seriously disappointing was the effect of the infantry fire. We have more than once drawn attention to the unsatisfactory nature of the musketry training of the British infantry soldier, and the truth of our remarks has been amply justified in this war. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that if the infantry had been as skilful with their weapons as we know the Boers to be, the losses of the enemy would have been ten times more than they



HIGHLANDERS IN POSSESSION OF EGYPTIAN REDOUBT.



EGYPTIAN PRISONERS.


were. The English were, fortunately, opposed to an enemy whose shooting was far worse than their own, and superiority, both natural and produced by discipline, was able to assert itself. We are firm believers in the strength, courage, and endurance of the British soldier, and feel sure that if ever those qualities are brought into action against Continental armies they will not fail to place the British infantry in the high position which it formerly held throughout the world. But they will be of little avail unless a radical improvement is made in rifle instruction and rifle practice. There is no existing army which might not be vastly improved in this respect. Until now foreign nations have granted much more ammunition for the annual practice than that allowed to English soldiers, and the training has been carried out in a more practical manner. Each Continental soldier costs a very small sum annually; and, as he uses more ammunition, the proportion of its cost to his own is very much greater than is the case in

this country. It would not be surprising, therefore, if critics of the military budget in France, Austria, or Germany were to object to an expenditure upon ammunition which, multiplied by the large number of men kept under arms, must amount to a very considerable figure. But here in England, where we have few men, every one of them representing not only his cost at home, but also the additional cost of carrying him to India or the colonies, it is pure recklessness to allow a single individual soldier to remain unversed in that kind of shooting which will be useful to him on the battle-field. There is nothing inherent in Englishmen to prevent them from being the best rifle shots in the world; indeed, our picked men are so, as has just been demonstrated in America. But such skill is only obtained by constant practice, and no chance has yet been given to the infantry of becoming expert in this, the source of their greatest power. The lines of Tel-el-Kebir were carried magnificently in old-fashioned style; but let us not deceive ourselves. All the gallantry of Graham's or Alison's brigades would have failed to take the position in that manner if it had been occupied by the troops of any Continental army.

The regiments would only have dashed themselves to pieces against such a fire as was delivered by the Turks from the parapets of Plevna or by the French army during the attack on St. Privat, when 8,000 Germans fell, killed or wounded, in a few minutes. Without detracting for an instant from the splendid gallantry of the brave lads who carried the Egyptian works at Tel-el-Kebir, it becomes us as a nation to remember with modesty that the enemy's troops were Oriental, half-trained, and apparently hardly trained at all in the practical use of the rifle. The necessity of far higher training in shooting is undoubtedly the first and greatest technical lesson to be drawn from the campaign of the Nile. It is also clear that to provide for the probability of rapid fire the barrels of the rifles should be surrounded, at the point where the left hand comes, with a guard made of some non-conducting substance. In the heat of action men cannot always remember to prevent their hand from touching the barrel, and if they come to bayonet work the barrel must be grasped.

But while the actions in Egypt have lowered military opinion as to the average power of infantry fire in the field, the reverse has been the case with regard to

the fire of field artillery, always supposing that it be well served by skilful gunners. Let us not be mistaken. Against troops hiding behind parapets projectiles from field-guns can make no impression whatever, unless they can succeed in taking the works in flank. This has been abundantly demonstrated both on the practice ground and in war, and has led to the adoption of the spade as one of the regular weapons of infantry. But troops remaining under cover can never by any possibility defeat the of an enemy. There must come a time when the troops of all arms will have to expose themselves in the field, and when that time comes and during the whole period when troops are manœuvring, the fire of good artillery is terribly destructive and demoralizing. It seems strange after the Franco-German campaign should be necessary to insist on this point. Both French and Germans attained a great part of the success of the




WOUNDED HIGHLANDER.



THE 13TH REINFORCEMENT

to the astonishing effect of the German Artillery. In the Russo-Turkish campaign, however, the Artillery on both sides was decidedly inefficient, and the result was a great many wild notions on the subject. We have now had an opportunity of seeing good guns on both sides, the English, however, superior to the Krupps, and we at once see clearly that Artillery badly served is of very little use, but well served has immense power. In the action of the 28th of August the two English Horse Artillery 13-pounders were officially said to have repelled attacks both from the front and flank throughout the day. We have yet to receive the official report of the 9th of September, but it has already been related by those who were present that the shrapnel shells of the English Artillery held in check the enemy's attack on the right, created great destruction, and absolutely prevented any advance of the Egyptians in that direction. Among the wounded brought in after the action of the 9th at Kassassin and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir were a very large number who had suffered from the fire of shrapnel shell, and an Egyptian officer stated that it was impossible to stand against our shrapnel when the Artillery obtained the proper range. If this be the case when only one or two batteries are in action, what must be the effect in the future of such masses of Artillery as the Germans deployed at Gravelotte, containing



BRITISH 13-POUNDER.

in each from 200 to 400 guns? The difficulty of all long-range fire is to obtain the proper distance, whether by range-finders or otherwise, and the mirage of the desert must have rendered that more difficult than usual in Egypt. In a long line of guns some of them are sure to have the right range, and both a front and flanking fire will be brought to bear upon any given spot at the same time. Field guns have been so much improved since the Franco-German campaign, and shrapnel has now been so generally adopted, that there is no instance on record which affords any example of the fire of modern Artillery with shrapnel shell. The 42 English guns deployed at Tel-el-Kebir would be a case in point but for the fact that they were chiefly firing against an enemy sheltered by parapets. It is satisfactory to know that a portion of

the English army has now had the opportunity of observing the effect of shrapnel upon troops in the open, even under the disadvantages of the mirage which made it so difficult to obtain the range accurately. Not only were the enemy's infantry broken by Artillery fire, but the guns abandoned at Mahuta and in the fight of the 9th at Kassassin are said to have been deserted, by the gunners chiefly because of the effect of shrapnel poured upon them. Under these circumstances it is well to direct attention once more to the necessity for Artillery carrying portable shields with them. We have only to conceive two opposing lines of Artillery both firing shrapnel, with, on the one side, gunners protected by shields, and, on the other, no such protection, to understand how great a difference would be produced in the effect of the fire.

The 13-pounders which did such execution in Egypt, and which are, at this moment, undoubtedly the best field guns ever employed in war, were muzzleloaders for the simple reason that sufficient breechloaders of the same high quality did not exist. But it would be a most glaring blunder to argue from this that in the re-armament of the Field Artillery, which must soon take place, muzzleloaders should be selected. It may be said that nearly the whole of the younger English Artillerists are in favour of breechloaders for Field Artillery, and such pieces would lend themselves with greater facility to use behind shields. Experimental breechloaders exist, and have been proved to be in every way satisfactory. It is to be hoped that there will be no such blunder as to argue that because a particular English muzzle-loader made in 1881 has proved itself superior to a Krupp breech-loader constructed before the Franco-German war, all muzzleloaders are superior to all breechloaders. This illogical argument is certain to be used in some quarters, and we protest against it beforehand.

Another point of controversy is the use of heavy cavalry. And here we cannot say that the Egyptian campaign has pointed to any distinct conclusion in the matter which had not already been arrived at after other campaigns during this



A TROOPER OF THE HORSE GUARDS.



THE OCCUPATION OF THE CITADEL OF CAIRO.




SIGNALLERS.

century. Heavy cavalry are the iron-clads of the field. In their proper time and place they are of the greatest value, and, indeed, compared with the really light cavalry, almost all that of the English may be said to be heavy. Heavy cavalry means big, powerful men on big horses. Light cavalry should mean small men, of the type of artillery drivers, on small but well-bred horses. Undoubtedly, such mounted men as these would do the ordinary work of cavalry with less loss than their heavier brethren, but they would not be quite so effective in a charge. Probably the verdict will be that the greater part of the cavalry should be light, but a portion of heavy cavalry should accompany every force in the field.

There are many other points to which we may perhaps hereafter invite attention, but only two of them shall be selected now, and the first is this, Has or has not the want of the lash made itself so prominent during the campaign

that the punishment of flogging ought to be restored? There have been some cries, especially from Alexandria, that officers do not know how to keep their men in order without it. On the other hand, Sir Garnet Wolseley has more than once called attention to the good discipline of his troops, whom he reminded immediately after landing at Ismailia that, as flogging had been abolished, there was no punishment but death for grave offences. We are not at all wedded to the punishments which have been brought into the service in place of flogging, and it is more than probable that some modification of them may be necessary, but the advocates of so degrading a punishment should be prepared to explain why the English soldier, who is becoming better educated every day and is entering the service from somewhat higher social strata, should alone of all the troops in Europe be so out of sympathy with his officers that they must always drive instead of leading him. It seems to us that officers should set themselves to the task of gaining power over their men by any means rather than that of mere terror of the lash. It is monstrous to suppose that the art of government except by flogging is unknown to English gentlemen.

Finally, perhaps, the most valuable lesson of the war is the proved necessity for a system of organized transport so prepared that the animals required for a campaign shall be landed at the same time as the men. The present Government will have no difficulty in answering whatever questions may be put to them with regard to their part in this matter. They have done far better than any Government ever did before them, but they were hampered by the constitutional difficulty of having no money to spend until at the last moment supplies are voted by Parliament. They did what they could in using at once the full sum granted for the annual remounts, and they would not have had even this pittance if the war had taken place towards the close of the financial year. An enormous amount of military transport takes place every year throughout the Empire. But it is almost all done by contractors, who have no duties and no arrangements whatever for providing transport in time of war. The Government have from first to last during this campaign purchased 10,000 mules. Why not now seize the opportunity of forming a nucleus with arrangements for developing it as rapidly as men are mobilized? The necessities of the State should stand before all else, and no contractor should be employed except on the condition that his animals are suitable for war purposes and are at the disposal of the Government in time of war.



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the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are aged 65 and over has increased from 10.5 million to 12.5 million, and the number of people aged 75 and over has increased from 4.5 million to 6.5 million (Office for National Statistics 2000). The number of people aged 65 and over is projected to increase to 15.5 million by 2020, and the number of people aged 75 and over to 8.5 million (Office for National Statistics 2000). The increase in the number of people aged 65 and over is expected to be due to a combination of factors, including a decline in the birth rate, a decline in the death rate, and a decline in the rate of immigration.

The increase in the number of people aged 65 and over is expected to have a significant impact on the UK's health and social care system. The number of people aged 65 and over who are in need of health and social care services is expected to increase from 1.5 million in 1990 to 2.5 million in 2020 (Office for National Statistics 2000). This increase is expected to be due to a combination of factors, including a decline in the birth rate, a decline in the death rate, and a decline in the rate of immigration.

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